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L’éducation et la formation constituent des enjeux fondamentaux pour la société contemporaine.  Deux équipes de 
recherche à l’UCL se préoccupent de ces questions : le Groupe interfacultaire de recherche sur les systèmes d’éducation et 
de formation (GIRSEF) et la Chaire UNESCO de pédagogie universitaire (CPU). 
 
Le GIRSEF est un groupe de recherche pluridisciplinaire fondé en 1998 afin d’étudier les systèmes d’éducation et de 
formation, réunissant des sociologues, économistes, psychologues et psychopédagogues.  L’attention est portée notamment 
sur l’évaluation des résultats des systèmes éducatifs en termes d’équité et d’efficacité, sur leurs modes de fonctionnement 
et de régulation, sur les politiques publiques à leur endroit, les logiques des acteurs principaux ou encore sur le 
fonctionnement local des organisations de formation et l’engagement et la motivation des apprenants.  Sur le plan 
empirique, ses recherches portent essentiellement sur le niveau primaire et secondaire d’enseignement, mais aussi sur 
l’enseignement supérieur et la formation d’adultes. 
 
La Chaire de Pédagogie Universitaire (CPU) a été créée en mai 2001 et a reçu le label de Chaire UNESCO en septembre 
2002.  Elle assure également le secrétariat et la coordination du Réseau Européen de Recherche et d’Innovation en 
Enseignement Supérieur (RERIES), réseau européen des chaires Unesco sur l’Enseignement supérieur.  Elle a pour 
mission de contribuer à la promotion de la qualité de la pédagogie universitaire à l’UCL, en contribuant à la fois à la 
recherche dans ce domaine et en coordonnant une formation diplômante en pédagogie universitaire (DES en pédagogie 
universitaire). 
 
Ces équipes se sont associées en 2004 pour proposer les Cahiers de recherche en Éducation et Formation, qui font suite 
aux Cahiers de recherche du Girsef, dont 25 numéros sont parus entre 1999 et 2003 .  La série des Cahiers de recherche en 
Éducation et Formation a pour objectif de diffuser les résultats des travaux menés au sein de la CPU et du GIRSEF auprès 
d’un large public, tant les chercheurs qui s’intéressent aux questions de l’éducation et de la formation qu’auprès des acteurs 
et décideurs de ces deux mondes.  
 
 
La compilation de l’ensemble des onze cahiers parus en 2004 est maintenant disponible dans un volume imprimé qui peut 
être commandé à partir du site www.i6doc.com, notre partenaire éditorial. 
Par ailleurs, chacun des cahiers de la série, depuis le premier numéro, peut être téléchargé gratuitement depuis le site 
d’I6doc (www.i6doc.com) et depuis les sites du GIRSEF (www.girsef.ucl.ac.be) et de la CPU (www.cpu.psp.ucl.ac.be). 
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Roemer’s’ 1998 seminal work on equality of 
opportunity has contributed to the emergence of a 
theory of justice that is modern, conceptually clear 
and easy to mobilize in policy design. In this paper, 
we apply Roemer’s theory to education policy. We 
first analyze the reallocations of educational 
expenditure required to equalize opportunities (taken 
to be test scores close to the end of compulsory 
education). Using Brazilian data, we find that 
implementing an equal-opportunity policy across 
pupils of different socio-economic background, by 
using per-pupil spending as the instrument, and 
ensuring that nobody receives less that 1/3 of the 
current national average, requires multiplying by 8.6 
the current level of spending on the lowest achieving 
pupils. This result is driven by the extremely low 
elasticity of scores to per-pupil spending. As such, it 
implies large reallocations that are probably 
politically unacceptable. By exploiting our knowledge 
of the education production function we then identify 
ways of reducing financial reallocations needed to 
achieve equality of opportunity. We show that the 
simultaneous redistribution of monetary and non-
monetary inputs, like peer group quality (i.e., 
desegregation) and school effectiveness (i.e., 
equalizing access to the best-run schools), 
considerably reduces – by almost 50% – the 
magnitude of financial redistribution needed. 
Implementing an EOp policy would not come at any 
particular cost (or benefit) in terms of efficiency. 
 
JEL classification: I28 (Education: Government 
Policy), H520 (National Government Expenditures 
and Education).  
 
Key works: Equality of Opportunity, Education, 
Formula Funding. 
Abstract 
Introduction 
In a nutshell, John Roemer’s’ seminal book on 
equality of opportunity (1998) defends the view that 
while some fraction of inequalities of outcome/
achievement is determined by morally acceptable 
factors, another fraction is caused by morally 
unacceptable factors. Roemer’s conception of equity 
and justice does not rest on gross outcome 
variables. He prefers instead to choose as relevant 
attributes conditional outcome variables, which 
somehow take into account the reasons underlying 
the achievement of a certain outcome. Inequalities 
caused by morally unacceptable factors (typically 
circumstances beyond an individual’s control like 
gender, race or socio-economic origin) should give 
rise to compensations in order to be eliminated. 
Inequality caused by legitimate factors (effort, 
autonomous choice etc.), in turn, should not call for 
compensation. The aim of an equal-opportunity 
policy is thus to equalize achievements across 
groups of individuals with similar circumstances. It is 
not to equalize achievements within these groups. 
This simple idea has been discussed and developed 
in the philosophical literature over the last forty 
years, and the debate has turned, to a great extent, 
around the demarcation of the frontier between the 
acceptable and the unacceptable, between what 
outcome gaps are to be compensated for and what 
advantages constitute legitimate claims by 
individuals. Economists have also contributed to the 
shaping of conceptions of justice of this kind, but on 
a different way, usually working at a more abstract 
level, making use of the mathematic language.  
In his celebrated book of 1998, Roemer has, not only 
translated that widespread conception of justice into 
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a precise mathematical formulation, but he has also 
provided a simple algorithm ready for policy use. He 
has labeled his theory with the appealing name of 
“equality of opportunity” (EOp for short). He has not 
tried to spell out what is acceptable and what is not. 
Instead, he has worked with a general and pluralistic 
demarcation, according to which inequalities due to 
circumstances – what is out of control of the 
individual – are considered unacceptable, while 
inequalities due to choices made by the individual – 
what is under control of the individual – are 
acceptable, and that the precise boundary is to be 
set by each society in the political arena. 
The aim of this paper is to apply such a theory to the 
particular domain of education policy. In section 1 we 
spell out in what sense our paper provides an 
original contribution to the EOp literature and we 
discuss how Roemer’s ideas can be applied to 
education. Section 2 contains a brief presentation of 
the Brazilian data used. In section 3, we compute the 
reallocations of educational expenditure required to 
equalize opportunities. We find that to implement an 
equal-opportunity policy by using per-pupil spending 
as the instrument requires multiplying the current 
level of spending of the lowest achieving type of 
pupils by a factor 8.6, while the level of spending on 
the highest achiever should be reduced. In section 4 
we then identify ways of reducing financial 
reallocations needed to achieve equality of 
opportunity. We show that the simultaneous 
redistribution of monetary and non-monetary inputs, 
like peer group quality and school effectiveness, 
considerably reduces the magnitude of financial 
redistribution required. In section 5, we assess 
efficiency under alternative allocations. Our results 
suggest that implementing EOp would not come at 
any particular cost (or benefit) in terms of efficiency. 
Section 6 concludes.  
1. Equality of opportunity and education policy 
Before turning to our subject matter, some words on 
the originality of this paper and on how it is related to 
the existing literature. On the one hand, there is a 
large literature discussing normative issues, both in 
economics (welfare economics) and in political 
philosophy (theories of distributive justice). Usually, 
this literature remains on theoretical and conceptual 
grounds. On the other hand, there is another strand 
of literature which is more policy-oriented, and its 
main concern is to propose formula funding schemes 
for the (re)distribution of inputs leading to different 
relevant outcomes (fiscal policy, health-care policy, 
education policy and so on). Generally, there is little, 
if any, explicit description of the underlying 
conception of justice in which they are based. The 
most important feature of this paper is that it bridges 
a link between a particular conception of justice that 
has been developed within the normative literature – 
namely, John Roemer’s theory – and a formula 
funding scheme in the domain of education. Thus we 
try to fill the gap by contributing to the development 
of an application of Roemer’s theory of equality of 
opportunity in the particular area of education. 
 
There are also some more specific features of this 
paper which make of it an original contribution to the 
literature. Firstly, while there are good reasons to 
care about income – possibly the “ultimate 
educational achievement” – such as Betts & Roemer 
(2004) and Roemer et al. (2003) do, we believe it is 
also important to focus on intermediate educational 
achievement. Thus, an original feature of this paper 
is that we focus on educational achievements in 
terms of test scores (score-EOp) as the outcome, 
and – consequently – on education policy as the 
instrument. A second original contribution of our 
paper is our refusal to focus exclusively on financial 
reallocations of educational resources. By exploiting 
our knowledge of the education production function, 
we enlarge the set of policy instruments, investigating 
how the simultaneous redistribution of monetary and 
non-monetary inputs – like peer group quality and 
school effectiveness – can reduce the magnitude of 
financial redistribution needed. Finally, a third 
important feature of this paper is that we do not limit 
our analysis to a first-best situation, but we explore 
some second-best situations, namely by imposing 
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some restrictions on the extent of the redistribution1. 
This amounts to say that we investigate situations in 
which inequality of opportunity is not intended to be 
fully eliminated, but only attenuated, following the 
proposal made by Moreno-Ternero (2004). 
Concretely, how should education policies be 
specified to equalize opportunity? Although 
Roemer’s framework is relatively easy to mobilize in 
policy design and can provide guidelines for many 
real life problems, implementation in the context of 
education still requires a gradual transposition.  
 
1.1. Circumstances, types and effort 
Betts & Roemer (2004) usefully remind us that five 
keywords constitute the vocabulary of the EOp 
theory: circumstances, type, effort, objective, and 
instrument. A type is the set of individuals with 
similar circumstances; the objective is the condition 
for which opportunities are to be equalized; and the 
instrument is the policy intervention used to effect 
that equalization. The equal-opportunity (EOp) policy 
is the value of the instrument which makes it the 
case that an agent's expected value of the objective 
is a function only of his effort and not of his 
circumstances. Thus, in order to equalize 
opportunities for young people to acquire basic 
(compulsory) education, the schooling system should 
be organized in such a way that a pupil’s score in 
math, science or reading be a function only of his 
effort and not of his circumstances. 
The reasoning starts with the observation that pupils 
will vary in their propensity of attaining some goal 
(e.g. get a certain score in math), due to 
circumstances – such as their race, or the socio-
economic status of their parents. And the bedrock of 
the EOp is to consider that they should not be held 
accountable for these circumstances-related 
achievement differences.  
Equal-opportunity ethics maintains that differences in 
the degree to which individuals achieve the goal in 
question that arise from their differential expenditure 
of effort are, morally speaking, perfectly all right. The 
partition of causes into circumstances and effort (or 
autonomous choice) is the central move that 
distinguishes Roemer’s EOp ethic from a strictly 
outcome-egalitarian conception of educational 
justice. While the latter vision implicitly holds the 
individual responsible for nothing, EOp emphasizes 
that an individual has a claim against society for a 
low outcome only if he expended sufficiently high 
effort. 
Before moving to the following point, we must add a 
comment on the nature of the agents we are dealing 
with in education. The center of our attention in this 
paper is scores of pupils whose age is typically 14. 
Following Roemer (1998), we shall divide these 
pupils into types assuming that all pupils within a type 
face the same set of circumstances. All the variation 
of scores of pupils within a given type shall be 
assumed to be caused by differential personal effort, 
and given that the amount of effort expended is a 
choice made by the individuals, there shall be no 
compensation for scores inequalities within type. An 
obvious question we might pose is whether it is 
reasonable to held pupils accountable for their effort, 
given that they are not adults, but kids or teenagers. 
Can we consider them to be fully able to take 
autonomous and informed decisions? Can they be 
held totally accountable for important choices they 
have to make in their schooling years (e.g., allocation 
of their time between leisure vs. studying)? During a 
large fraction of their school lives, individuals can not 
be said to be perfect judges for what is good for 
themselves, kids are possibly "economically myopic”, 
since they are unable to evaluate all the future 
benefits that are made available if he or she acquires 
education in the present time, and they make choices 
according to other, non-monetary, motivations 
(Akerlof & Kranton, 2002). To sum up, if we push the 
argument far enough, we could conclude that 
circumstances account for virtually all the variability 
of educational outcomes, that is, that all inequality is 
unacceptable, which would amount to say that 
Roemer’s theory is useless in this case – we could 
trivially conclude that the policy objective must be 
one which consists of equalizing pupils’ scores. 
The objection makes sense. Indeed a great part of 
inequalities in educational outcomes could be 
attributed to circumstances. Notwithstanding, we 
defend the applicability of Roemer’s theory to our 
problem for both fundamental and pragmatic 
reasons. The fundamental reason is that a fraction of 
1 Betts & Roemer (2003) also simulate different scenarios, 
which include limited redistributions. 
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educational achievements can be credited to the 
pupil itself, at least to those of a certain minimal age. 
While it is clear that considering a 5 year-old pupil 
accountable for his efforts is not reasonable, the 
claim loses strength when we are talking about a 14-
15 year-old youngster, who lives, and is being further 
prepared to live, in societies where people are, at 
least partially, held accountable for their acts. For his 
own benefit, he should be prepared to respond for 
his acts. Acquiring knowledge and skills depends 
upon natural and social circumstances (talent, quality 
of family support etc.), but it also requires personal 
commitment and effort, and these variables can be 
considered to be under control of the individual to a 
certain extent.  
There are at least three pragmatic reasons for 
conditioning inequalities upon choices and 
circumstances. Firstly, if all are circumstances, 
score-EOp would require the equalization of scores 
across all individuals, possibly at a low level, given 
that the low-talented would never be able to reach 
high levels of achievements2. The second pragmatic 
argument involves efficiency issues. Even if a given 
society may be willing to reduce educational 
inequalities for ethical reasons, reducing them could 
be so costly that it refrains from pursuing this 
objective. The equalization objective may be costly, 
not only because of large talent gaps, but also 
because detailed information accounting for all 
relevant circumstances may be costly to gather 
(Trannoy, 2003). Alternatively, that society may 
refrain from pursuing full equalization, but to pursue 
instead, some less costly compromise (partial 
equalization). In any case, efficiency concerns may 
constitute obstacles to a full neutralization of the 
effect of circumstances. The third pragmatic reason 
is that some side-condition may be imposed, such as 
stating that all individuals have the right to a 
minimum level of education, regardless of their 
circumstances and choices. If every kid (of a given 
age, for example) really reaches a pre-defined 
minimal level of education, then society will have 
done a contribution, be it moderate, to neutralize the 
effects of circumstances. The objection on the 
relevance of the demarcation circumstances versus 
choices would only be applicable beyond that pair 
age-achievement.  
 
1.2. Outcome and instrument(s) 
In principle, any outcome variable is compatible with 
the EOp agenda when applied to education. A 
possible candidate is individuals’ earnings or income, 
since they reflect, to a certain extent, his well-being.  
In a paper connected to this one, Bettts & Roemer 
(2004) have been trying – regressing wages on per 
pupil spending – to assess what would have been the 
necessary redistribution and/or increase of spending-
per-pupil (i.e., the instrument) in the US in order for 
the income-EOp objective to be achieved across 
types of individuals (i.e., race and/or socio-economic 
groups). They conclude that the extent of the 
necessary redistribution would be quite substantial, 
especially when circumstances are defined in terms 
of race, in which case the per-pupil spending ratio 
between white and black kids would oscillate 
between 8 (lower bound) and 80 (upper bound). 
These results are found because of the extremely 
low income-elasticities to per-pupil-spending 
obtained in their regressions. When circumstances 
are defined simultaneously in terms of parents’ 
education and race, the per-pupil spending ratio 
between the better-off and the worse-off types would 
be about 14.  
A logical variant to this approach consists of using 
another instrument than per-pupil spending, but at a 
later stage: income taxation and transfers3. Roemer 
et al. (2003) have tried to asses how well fiscal 
regimes of eleven industrialized countries perform as 
far as the income-EOp objective is concerned. They 
find that fiscal regimes of some countries in Northern 
Europe do very well in terms of income-EOp 
objective. They conclude by raising an efficiency 
issue, namely, on whether redistributive taxation is 
more or less effective than educational policies as an 
EOp instrument. They are quite skeptical about 
education as a means for implementing income-EOp. 
In this paper, in turn, neither do we take income to be 
2 What is known as the “leveling down” objection. 
3 Possibly motivated by the idea that achieving the 
income-EOp objective through redistribution of 
educational resources would require radical – probably 
politically unfeasible – reallocations. 
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the relevant outcome variable, nor do we focus on 
post-education instruments (e.g. tax-and-transfers). 
Rather, we focus on educational achievements in 
terms of test scores (score-EOp) as the outcome, 
and – consequently – on education policy as the 
instrument. Such a choice requires some 
justification. While there are good reasons to care 
about earnings – what could be called the “ultimate 
educational achievement” – such as Betts & Roemer 
(2004) and Roemer et al. (2003) do, we believe it is 
also important to focus on intermediate educational 
achievement such as scores in tests of cognitive 
ability.  
First of all, because there is evidence on the 
existence of positive links between the performance 
of students in tests and their future earning capacity 
(Currie & Ducan, 2001). If this is true, by aiming at 
equality of opportunity for achieving scores, we 
would be setting the seeds for achieving income-
EOp years later. 
Secondly, for efficiency or political feasibility reasons, 
it may be relevant to focus on the distribution of test 
scores instead of that of income. For a given society 
to achieve income-EOp, the two papers cited above 
show it would be necessary, either to massively 
change the allocation of school resources, or to 
redistribute income massively (with efficiency costs 
and well-known disincentive effects). If reshaping the 
distribution of test scores involves less dramatic 
reallocations of resources, that line of action may be 
a good policy instrument that would contribute for the 
achievement of income-EOp in 10- to 15-years time.  
The third reason for focusing on pupils’ skills is 
related to the widely recognized importance of 
educational achievements. At least since the seminal 
works of Schultz (1963) and Becker (1964) 
economists recognize that education has an 
important economic value. It is a means, or resource, 
for achieving a wide array of personal goals. 
Educational achievements can be good predictors of 
the access to college, of future earnings capacity and 
of the social position an individual holds. But 
education is also likely to be positively correlated to 
outcome variables or “advantages” valued by various 
theories of justice, and not only within the normative 
framework usually adopted by economists (i.e. 
welfarism). Being more educated might enhance the 
probabilities that an individual scores higher in the 
distribution of primary goods defined by John Rawls 
(1971), of functionings (achievements) and 
capabilities (freedom) defined by Sen (1985), but 
also of other “mesojustice” attributes, such as health 
status, for example (Grossman, 2005). Finally, 
beyond all the doors education opens, it can also be 
seen as an end in itself, as an attribute of a "good 
life" (Sen, 1985). That is, being educated may have 
an intrinsic value, regardless of the effect it may have 
(and will have) on other objectives. 
Having agreed on taking test scores as the 
advantage/outcome, we now turn to the issues of 
which aspects of education policy are relevant for 
achieving score-EOp. Like Betts & Roemer (2004) 
we focus on per-pupil spending. Our aim, with this 
paper, is also to provide estimates of the required 
changes in the distribution of spending per pupil 
securing EOp. However, we argue that it is useful to 
enlarge the scope of instruments that can be used 
and not limit ourselves to reallocations of monetary 
resources. We argue that policymakers can, and 
even should, intervene by redistributing non-
monetary resources. 
Our aim is to better exploit the results highlighted by 
the abundant literature on education production 
function (Hanushek, 1986 and 1997; Belfield, 2000). 
Of course per-pupil spending and its components 
(teacher salary, class-size, capital expenditure etc.) 
will always be central to education policy design. Yet, 
we believe that the production function literature 
largely legitimizes integrating non-monetary inputs to 
the EOp  
Several authors (Monk, 1992; Haveman & Wolfe, 
1984; Vandenberghe, 2002) have shown that a 
pupil's achievement could indeed be influenced by 
variables with no immediate monetary expression: 
the pupils themselves and their human capital 
background. Education is one of those services 
wherein outputs depend partially on the customers as 
inputs. In addition, the presence of other customers 
(as inputs) often contributes to the output 
'experienced' by each customer individually 
(Rothschild & White, 1995)). Human capital 
endowment of pupils and their aggregation – the 
student body composition – apparently condition the 
productivity of more classical inputs (teacher-pupil 
ratios, teacher salary, capital, sport and scientific 
facility…). The point here is that peer quality – due to 
well known segregation phenomena – can be 
unequally distributed and contribute to (in)equality of 
opportunity. 
Several case studies (Monk, 1992)), but also nation-
wide empirical research (Hanushek, 1986, 1997) and 
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international studies (Vandenberghe & Robin, 2004) 
also highlight the critical role played by intra-
organizational attributes. The technological relation 
between inputs and outputs is conditional to the 
presence of organizational assets. These cannot be 
directly related to the amount of monetary resources 
made available by the public authority. There is some 
evidence that, in many countries, pupils attending 
privately-run schools benefit from a higher level of 
organizational effectiveness than those enrolled in 
public schools. The point, again, is that school 
effectiveness can be unequally distributed among 
pupils and contribute to (in)equality of opportunity. 
6 In the final samples used in this study, a majority of 8th 
grade pupils (71%) were 15 or less by the time they did the 
SAEB exams. However, the range is actually quite wide – 
maximum pupil age in the sample is 19 – especially 
because of grade repetition and irregular school 
2. Data 
The data we use come from the 2001 wave of SAEB 
(Basic Education Assessment System), a survey on 
pupils' achievement carried out by INEP, a research 
bureau subordinated to the Brazilian Ministry of 
Education. While the SAEB is not suitable for 
international comparisons, its objectives and 
statistical design, and the procedures employed in 
the application of the test, have been inspired by, 
and do not differ very much from, well-known cross-
country assessments of pupils’ performance, such as 
PISA, TIMMS/PIRLS, and LLECE4. 
SAEB consists of countrywide tests that evaluate 
pupils’ cognitive abilities in Portuguese5 but also in 
Mathematics. Test score information is coupled with 
data on relevant features of pupils and their family, 
as well as teachers’, principals’ and schools’ 
characteristics. The global database consists of 
repeated cross-sections (not panels) of 
representative samples of schools and students. 
Firstly, schools are randomly chosen to take part in 
the SAEB. Secondly, one or two classes inside each 
school are randomly selected. All students of a given 
selected class have to pass the SAEB exam, but 
only in one of the subjects. 
SAEB focuses on the evaluation of pupils at three 
key stages of their formal education: 4th and 8th year 
of primary school, and 3rd year of secondary school. 
Schooling is mandatory in Brazil for children up to 14 
years, regardless of the grade they are attending. 
The 8th grade sample constitutes a good 
approximation for the end of compulsory schooling, 
since most of its students are in fact around 14 years 
old6. Moreover, 8th grade pupils are less likely to 
have dropped out than 3rd grade of secondary school 
pupils. Finally, the 8th grade datasets have fewer 
missing data in key questions (e.g., mother’s 
education) as compared to the 4th grade. For these 
reasons, we focus exclusively on the 8th grade 
sample. 
Pupils' test scores correspond to subject-specific 
scales elaborated by INEP staff together with 
teachers, researchers, and national and international 
survey experts. Possible scores range from 0 to 500, 
and are supposed to evaluate skills and abilities of 
students. The SAEB scale is continuous and 
hierarchical, which means that a pupil who achieves 
a certain score – say, 400 in the Portuguese test – 
has all the literacy skills held by students who scored, 
say, 150, 300 or 380, plus some additional skills. For 
example, he might be able to understand and 
interpret more complex texts than his peers who 
scored lower. Because of the invariance of the scale, 4 The INEP website (http://www.inep.gov.br) contains 
useful information concerning evaluation of students in 
Brazil, most of which in Portuguese, in the section 
“Avaliação e Exames”. INEP (2002) provides specific 
information about the 2001 wave of SAEB. INEP (2004) 
provides information about the SAEB exam in English.  
5 Portuguese is the official language in Brazil and it is the 
native language of nearly all Brazilians. 
Page  10 
Les Cahiers de Recherche en Éducation et Formation  - n° 50 - December 2005 
pupils' scores are comparable across years and 
across grades. Scores are not comparable across 
subjects, but the distributions of scores do not look 
very different in Portuguese and in Mathematics7.  
This data set contains information about teachers’ 
gross monthly wages expressed in “salários 
mínimos” (SM), an index frequently used in Brazilian 
administrative data8, as well a number of pupils in the 
classroom where the test was implemented (i.e., the 
teacher-to-pupils ratio). The product of the two gives 
a reasonable proxy of per-pupil spending (at the 
classroom level) expressed in units of SM per pupil.  
Ideally, a type should be defined as a set of 
individuals facing the same circumstances. In 
practice, however, it is impossible to define types so 
perfectly, and so we have to turn to some proxy 
which allows us to define types as sets of individuals 
facing similar circumstances. The SAEB data set 
contains a series of socio-economic variables, one of 
them being the highest degree obtained by the 
pupil’s mother. We assume here that such variable is 
a good proxy for pupils’ circumstances, since it is 
known to be highly correlated with a number of past, 
current and future advantages an individual faces. 
So the highest degree obtained by the pupil’s mother 
is the variable we choose to define pupil’s type (t). 
We also use the highest degree obtained by the 
pupil’s mother to compute some proxy – in fact a 
simple average – of the quality of the peers (PEER) 
from which the pupil might benefit/suffer at the 
classroom level. Finally, SAEB tells us about the 
public vs. private nature of the school attended. A 
public school is a school managed directly by a 
public authority (the state or the municipality). A 
private school is a school managed directly by a non-
government organization (e.g. a church, business or 
any other private institution). In brief, the underlying 
classification is not that of the origin of financial 
resources, but the legal status of the board. When 
that variable is used as a dummy (PRIV) in 
regression, it can help us quantify the importance of 
the school effectiveness as an input, and assess its 
potential role in achieving EOp.  
Descriptive statistics are reported in table 1. We 
notice that the average score (S) varies considerably 
from type to type. The amounts of resources, both 
monetary (X) and non-monetary (PEER and PRIV), 
which are available for each type are also very 
different. The higher the education level of pupils’ 
mothers, the higher are the level of pupils’ 
educational inputs and output. 
7 SAEB scales have been built in such a way that the mean 
and the dispersion were identical across subjects, for the 
8th grade, in the 1997 wave. Averages were set to 250, and 
standard deviations were set to 50. 
8 Literally it means minimum wage, but actually, more 
than defining the actual value of the Brazilian wages, it is 
used as an economic index. In October 2001, when SAEB 
tests took place, one unit of SM was worth 68 US dollars. 
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3.1. The EOp algorithm and its specification 
Following the strategy of Betts & Roemer (2004), but 
defining the outcome variable as Portuguese test 
scores (S) at the age of 14, we first compute the 
reallocation of spending per pupil (X) that would be 
necessary to equalize opportunities. We consider 
reallocations of spending per pupil across types of 
pupils, given a fixed educational budget per pupil (R).  
However, since such reallocations are virtually 
guaranteed to reduce spending per pupil dramatically 
for certain types, we also calculate EOp solutions 
where the constraint is that each type receives at 
least a fraction, α, of the per-pupil educational 
budget, R.  
Similar circumstances are used to partition student 
data into types (t). In this paper, we define only five 
types using information on the highest degree of the 
mother9. The idea of effort, in Roemer’s framework, 
is captured by the rank of the student in the within-
type conditional distribution of effort. In statistical 
terms, this rank (and thus the level of effort) can be 
adequately captured by the quantile, π, of the type-
specific distribution of score. 
Supposing that pupils of type t and quantile π are 
allocated an amount Xtπ of the resource, and 
assuming that the education production function 
connecting resources to (the natural log of) score (S) 
is of the form: 
lnS(Xt,π) = aπ + bπ. Xtπ + Zt c+ ε                                     [1] 
where: 
t: pupil’s type (i.e., mother’s highest degree); 
S: Portuguese score,  
π: within type score quantile to which the pupil 
belongs;  
X : per-pupil spending;  
Z : a vector of control variables 
 
The core of the EOp allocation problem consists of 
identifying, for each quantile π, the vector Xπ = (X1π, 
X2π …XTπ) that equalizes (expected) scores, subject to 
the following budget constraint: 
R= ∑ pt Xtπ                                                                       [2] 
where: 
R: the average per-pupil spending 
pt: the share of type t pupils in total population 
9 Isced classification. 
Mother’s  
highest degree (which defines 
types) Observations 
 
 
Pct. 
Average score 
in Portuguese 
test 
(S) 
Per-pupils 
spending 
(X) 
Index of 
peer quality 
(PEER) 
Probability of 
attending a 
private 
school (PRIV) 
All 45,030 100.00 246.45 0.153 3.25 0.36 
At most primary education 1 3,054 6.78 212.92 0.121 2.54 0.06 
Lower secondary 2 11,652 25.88 226.57 0.131 2.67 0.08 
Upper secondary 3 9,950 22.10 236.11 0.143 3.00 0.20 
Tertiary short 4 11,741 26.07 258.65 0.158 3.55 0.52 
Tertiary long 5 8,633 19.17 280.47 0.200 4.15 0.82 
Table 1 – Descriptive statistics 
3. Per-pupil spending and score-EOp 
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As results will make it clear later on, equalizing 
within-quantile scores will virtually never be possible 
without the absurd implication of imposing negative 
values of the educational input to some types (that is, 
pupils belonging to high-performing types would 
have to be “taxed”, transferring resources to their 
low-performing peers). In this case the EOp agenda 
will, de facto, have to become one which aims at 
minimizing score inequalities as much as possible – 
that is, a maximin approach replaces an egalitarian 
one10. In this paper it will be the automatic 
consequence of imposing the additional constraint 
that nobody receives resources which are less than a 
fraction α of the current national average (R). 
 
 Xtπ ≥ α R                                                                 [3] 
 
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that the EOp 
algorithm as we exposed it so far amounts to 
maximizing several objectives simultaneously (one 
per quantile). To come closer to a solution that is 
practically feasible, one second-best approach must 
be taken. Like Roemer, our compromise will be to 
take an average. For example, suppose, as we do in 
this paper, we work with the 3 first quartiles of score 
in each type. We first compute, for each quartile the 
investment policy that equalizes (expected) scores, 
across the various types. This would give us 3 
different investment policies. And we declare the 
EOp policy to be the average of these 3 policies. 
 
3.2. EOp and quantile regressions 
Roemer (1998) emphasizes that, as the distribution 
of effort of a type is a characteristic of the type and 
not of any individual, it is a circumstance for a 
particular individual. For example, if an individual’s 
effort is low in absolute terms because he belongs to 
a type whose mean effort is low, this individual 
should not be held responsible. He claims that we 
should turn our attention to relative levels of effort 
within given types, and that relative effort is best 
captured by the rank of an individual in the effort 
distribution of his type, or at least by the quantile to 
which he belongs in such distribution. 
With regards to an empirical application of Roemer’s 
theory to education, we have to bear in mind that the 
impact of school spending on score for a given type 
of pupil may vary with the pupil’s effort (i.e., the 
quantile to which he belongs) in the score 
distribution. Quantile regressions (Koenker & 
Bassett, 1978), estimated separately for each type of 
pupils, constitute the most appropriate technique for 
the application of Roemer’s EOp theory. The set of 
coefficients obtained from quantile regressions 
performed for each type of pupils allows for non-
linearities in the relation between score and spending 
per pupil.  
 
3.3. Score-EOp results 
We have estimated equation [1] three times (π=0.25, 
0.5, 075) for each of our five types of pupils (1-5). 
Vector Z includes current level of peer quality (PEER) 
and private school dummy (PRIVD).  
Using the set of estimated coefficients a, b, c, d and 
rewriting equation [1] by type as: 
 
lnS(Xt, π) = Aπ + bπ. Xtπ + ε                                      [4] 
 
with Aπ = aπ + cπPEERtπ Xtπ + dπPRIVD 
 
we get 5 linear functions of Xtπ providing the 
expected score for each type of pupils. Exploiting the 
idea that EOp basically means equalizing expected 
score across types, and using the budget constraint, 
we develop a system of T+ 1 equations, which is 
resolved incrementally: 
 
- XTπ as a function of R and XT-1π,..., X1π 
- XT-1π as a function of R and XT-2π,..., X1π 
- ... 
- X1π as a function of R and the set of known (p) or 
estimated parameters (A(a,c,d), b)  
 
In table 2, panel A, we report the current level of per-
pupil spending for each type, and the distribution of 
scores for each type and quartile. We also report in 
table 2 the allocation of inputs and distributions of 
scores obtained as a result of two redistributions of 
inputs (as our benchmark policies): (i) Panel B: 
assuming an input-egalitarian allocation of per-pupil 
spending (Xi=R, for all i), and (ii) Panel C: the score-
EOp distribution.  
10 For more details, see appendix 
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Table 2 – Reallocation required for achieving score-EOp with no minimal per-pupil spending restriction 
Quantile 
(π) Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4 TYPE 5 
Average 
score* (AS) 
Efficiency  
ratio** (V) 
Frequencies (%) 6.78 25.88 22.10 26.07 19.17 - - 
PANEL A:  
CURRENT Current allocation of per pupil spending (XC)  
  
All 0.121 0.131 0.143 0.158 0.200 - - 
 Current distribution of score (SC)    
q25 184.69 197.53 206.18 229.38 252.84 217.48 - 
q50 213.88 226.75 237.50 260.31 283.13 247.81 - 
q75 241.67 255.86 265.87 288.26 310.44 276.02 - 
        
PANEL B: EQUAL-
RESOURCE Equal resource policy (XER)  
  
All 0.150 0.150 0.150 0.150 0.150 - - 
 Distribution of score under equal resource policy (SER)    
q25 185.50 198.28 206.50 229.24 251.44 217.49 1.0001 
q50 214.56 227.38 237.86 260.14 281.69 247.78 0.9999 
q75 242.20 256.55 266.27 288.08 309.16 276.03 1.0000 
        
PANEL C: EOP Allocation of X necessary to achieve score-EOp (XEOP)    
q25 1.376 0.727 0.540 -0.200 -1.017 - - 
q50 1.593 0.813 0.415 -0.209 -1.053 - - 
q75 2.071 0.749 0.388 -0.175 -1.151 - - 
Average 1.680 0.763 0.448 -0.195 -1.074 - - 
1=current national 
average (i.e., 
R=0.15) 11.201 5.087 2.984 -1.300 -7.157 - - 
 Distribution of score under EOp (SEOP)    
q25 218.58 218.58 218.58 218.58 218.58 218.58 1.0051 
q50 246.88 246.88 246.88 246.88 246.88 246.88 0.9962 
q75 275.45 275.45 275.45 275.45 275.45 275.45 0.9979 
* Weighted, across-types, score average. 
** Ratio of average achievement under the policy considered with respect to current average achievement. 
Page  14 
Les Cahiers de Recherche en Éducation et Formation  - n° 50 - December 2005 
The distribution of scores that results from the input-
egalitarian allocation of the education input (SER) is 
not extremely different from the current distribution of 
scores (SC). In fact, for any pair type-quantile, the 
changes would be less than 1%, in absolute value. 
For example, for type 1, quantile 0.25, while current 
average score is 184.69, under an egalitarian 
allocation of spending per pupil, average score would 
increase to 185.50, a positive variation of 0.44%. For 
type 5, quantile 0.75, there would be a negative 
oscillation of 0.41%, with average scores decreasing 
from 310.44 to 309.16. So, moving from current 
allocation of inputs into an input-egalitarian allocation 
of inputs would involve a certain amount of 
redistribution of inputs (especially from type 5 
individuals), with quite modest impacts on scores. 
More importantly, such a policy would not be in line 
with EOp ethics, since it would not provide sufficient 
compensation for types whose circumstances are not 
favorable. 
In contrast, when we compare the current distribution 
of scores (SC) with the distribution of scores under 
EOp allocation (SEOP), variations are substantial. For 
the same types and quantiles mentioned in the 
previous paragraph, the variations of average scores 
would be, respectively, of 18.35% (from 184.69 to 
218.58) and of –11.27% (from 310.44 to 275.45).  
If we focus on the values of X securing score-EOp 
(XEOP), we immediately note the dramatic and 
immense reallocation that is required by the EOp 
agenda. If the aim of the social planner is really to 
equalize expected scores across types, it will be 
necessary to multiply the current level of spending of 
the lowest achieving type of pupils by a factor 11, 
while the level of spending on the highest achiever 
should actually be multiplied by a factor –7 (thus 
become negative).  Combining information presented 
on tables 1 and 2, we can observe that a 
considerable fraction of the pupils’ population would 
have to make efforts in order for the score-EOp 
allocation to be achieved. Ex ante well-off pupils 
(types 4 and 5), those who would face a decrease in 
their relative input allocation, represent around 45% 
of the pupils’ population, while the ex ante worse-off 
groups (types 1, 2 and 3) represent about 55%. 
The reader should take good note of the fact that this 
result is based on a conservative interpretation of the 
score to spending elasticities (i.e. b). We have 
indeed assumed that these coefficients capture the 
sensitivity of scores to the average (or cumulated) 
per pupil spending since entrance in the education 
system. But the measure of spending we used (X) is 
purely cross-sectional and 8th-grade-specific. Should 
our b thus be interpreted as the effect of current (and 
not average or cumulated) spending on score? If so, 
EOp could be achieved gradually, and not on one 
shot. Table 2 suggests for example that raising type 
1’s score to the EOp target means spending 1.680 
instead of the current 0.121. Assuming constant 
elasticity (i.e., bs are of similar magnitude across 
grades) and constant return to scale (i.e., repeated 
small increments of X produce similar score 
improvements as a single big one), the same EOp 
type-1 score could be achieved over a period of 9 
years (1 pre-primary grade + 8 primary school 
grades) and require an increment of 0.173 per year11. 
This could appear as a redistribution of much lower 
magnitude and possibly be perceived as more 
politically acceptable.  
Yet, from a purely econometric point of view, we 
believe it makes more sense to stick to our initial and 
rather conservative interpretation where the bs 
capture the relationship between score and average 
(or cumulated) spending. It is well know, from the 
production function literature, that coefficients 
estimated using cross-sectional data are generally 
upward biased. The intuitive reason, put into the 
context of our data, is that 8th grade per-pupil 
spending is most likely highly correlated with per-
pupil spending during all preceding grades. Hence, 
our assumption that X could be nothing more than a 
proxy for average or cumulated spending12.  
Table 3 contains the results of a similar exercise, but 
where we impose that each type should get at least a 
fraction, α, of the current national average per-pupil 
spending, R – in line with Roemer’s idea that EOp 
should be more about maximizing the achievement of 
the worst-off types (maximin). We arbitrarily set 
α=1/3. An interesting result of this exercise is to be 
found in the distribution of scores (S’EOP). While there 
are large gains for some type-quantile pairs (e.g., 
average score increases by 14.01% for type 1, 
quantile 0.25), there are not important losses for any 
pair type-quantile. The type-quantile pair which is 
11 (1.680-0.121)/9 = 0.173. 
12 We tend to apply the same reasoning to cross-sectional 
peer quality (PEER) and private school attendance 
likelihood (PRIV). The values they take for 8th grade are 
likely to be proxies for average values since the beginning 
of schooling. 
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mostly penalized is type 5, quantile 0.25, whose loss 
is only about 1.78%. 
But in this case, roughly 2/3 of the population (types 
3, 4 and 5) would be penalized in order to make sure 
that roughly 1/3 of the pupils (types 1 and 2) achieve 
average scores that would be in line with this weaker 
version of score-EOp allocation. And, more 
importantly, even in this less ambitious context, our 
results suggest that per-pupil spending on the low 
achieving type should be multiplied by the still large 
factor of 8.6. 
Table 3 – Reallocation required for achieving score-EOp, with each type receiving at least 1/3 of R 
Quantile 
(π) Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4 Type 5 
Average 
score* (AS) 
Efficiency 
ratio** (V) 
Frequencies (%) 6.78 25.88 22.10 26.07 19.17 - - 
 Current allocation of per pupil spending (XC)    
All 0.121 0.131 0.143 0.158 0.200 - - 
        
 Allocation of X to achieve score-EOp, with α=1/3 (X’EOP)    
q25 1.098 0.507 0.050 0.050 0.050 - - 
q50 1.176 0.487 0.050 0.050 0.050 - - 
q75 1.468 0.410 0.050 0.050 0.050 - - 
Average 1.283 0.459 0.050 0.050 0.050 - - 
1=current national 
average (i.e., 
R=0.15) 8.551 3.057 0.333 0.333 0.333 - - 
   
q25 210.56 210.56 203.37 226.06 248.34 220.26 1.0128 
q50 237.03 237.03 234.37 256.28 278.52 249.41 1.0065 
q75 264.52 264.52 262.31 284.04 306.34 277.14 1.0041 
Distribution of score under EOp, with α=1/3 (S’EOP)  
* Weighted, across-types, score average. 
** Ratio of average achievement under the policy considered with respect to current average achievement. 
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Following the intuition we exposed in section 2, we 
now turn to the case where the EOp algorithm is 
applied after some reallocation of non-monetary 
inputs has taken place. Algebraically, this means that 
we redefine A in equation [4] to become. 
 
A*π = aπ + cπPEER* Xtπ + dπPRIVD* [5] 
 
where PEER* is the national average of the peer 
quality endowment and PRIVD* is the national 
average attendance at private schools. Using 
parameters (A*, b) we then identify the EOp solution, 
following the same logic as the one exposed in 
section 3.3 
Table 4 shows that the simultaneous redistribution of 
monetary and non-monetary inputs, like peer group 
quality and school effectiveness, considerably 
reduces the magnitude of financial redistribution 
required. We show that per-pupil spending on the 
low achieving type should now be multiplied only by 
a factor 4.8, quite lower than the 8.6 obtained 
previously.  
In this case, the burden of the policy would be bore 
by 45% of the population (types 4 and 5). The 
variations of scores would range from –12.54% to 
+15.08%. 
4. Per-pupil spending, non-monetary inputs and score-EOp 
Table 4 – Reallocation required for achieving score-EOp, with each type receiving at least 1/3 of R and with ex-ante 
redistribution of non-monetary inputs: peer quality (full de-segregation) and school effectiveness (equal probability of 
attending a private school) 
Quantile (π) Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4 Type 5 
Average 
score* (AS) 
Efficiency 
ratio** (V) 
Frequencies 6.78 25.88 22.10 26.07 19.17   
 Current allocation of per pupil spending (XC)    
All 0.121 0.131 0.143 0.158 0.200   
        
 
Allocation of X to achieve score-EOp, with α=1/3 and 
redistribution of non-monetary inputs (X’’EOP)  
  
q25 0.653 0.222 0.132 0.050 0.050   
q50 0.617 0.253 0.108 0.050 0.050   
q75 0.903 0.185 0.099 0.050 0.050   
Average 0.724 0.220 0.113 0.050 0.050   
1=current national 
average (i.e., R=0.15) 4.828 1.466 0.754 0.333 0.333   
   
q25 212.55 212.55 212.55 217.81 221.14 215.57 0.9912 
q50 243.15 243.15 243.15 248.36 252.51 246.30 0.9939 
q75 270.78 270.78 270.78 276.78 285.42 275.15 0.9969 
Distribution of score under EOp, with α=1/3 (S’’EOP)  
* Weighted, across-types, score average. 
** Ratio of average achievement under the policy considered with respect to current average achievement. 
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5. Efficiency issues  
As pointed by Betts & Romer (2004), policies aimed 
at equalizing achievement – be it in a strictly 
egalitarian or in an EOp perspective – are often 
criticized for being ‘inefficient’, that is, for decreasing 
average (or total) output. It is indeed possible that 
when one reallocates per-pupil spending (X), the 
overall score (S) will diminish. That would typically 
the case if relative elasticities (i.e., b) were higher for 
types 4 or 5 from which resources are being 
removed.  
Therefore we also calculate an efficiency indicator 
(V), defined as the ratio between the average score 
(ASEOP) predicted to occur under an EOp scenario 
and the current average score (ASC). Our 
calculations are based on the assumptions that type 
frequencies (first line of Tables 2, 3 and 4) computed 
from our dataset adequately represent the Brazilian 
reality. 
Results appear in the last two columns of Tables 2, 
3, 4.  Efficiency ratios values all are very close to 1, 
which suggests that implementing EOp would not 
come at any particular cost (or benefit) in terms of 
efficiency. A closer look at the results shows 
however that not all EOp policies are efficient-
equivalent. An EOp agenda, with no lower bound 
limit to per-pupil spending, could lead to a reduction 
of average score of up to 0.5 percent (last column of 
Table 2). The policy that simultaneously redistributes 
monetary and non-monetary resources could also 
mean a reduction of average score of up to 0.8 
percent (Table 4). By contrast, the variant of EOp in 
which each type receives at least 1/3 of R could lead 
to an increase of the average score of 0.5 to 1 
percent (Table 3). 
6. Conclusions 
We applied Roemer’s EOp theory to education policy 
to Brazilian data, calculating the reallocations of 
educational expenditure required to equalize test 
scores opportunities for pupils of different socio-
economic background.  
In Brazil, current educational spending pattern is 
miles away from one which would consist of 
providing each pupil with an equal amount of 
spending (egalitarian allocation of inputs). Thus even 
the most conservative reallocation scheme 
mentioned here – which would not sufficiently 
compensate people for their circumstances and 
which would lead to modest results in terms of shifts 
in scores – would already require important policy 
changes, certainly with considerable practical 
difficulties, let alone political resistance. For example, 
how expenditure could be reallocated across types if 
pupils from rich families (typically from type 5) usually 
study in private schools, where teachers earn higher 
wages, while poor pupils go to public schools, where 
wages are lower?13  
When we turn to EOp policies, practical and political 
difficulties would arguably be even greater, because 
these policies would involve substantial reallocations 
of resources between types. In a more sensible 
setting – namely, one which ensures that nobody 
receives less that 1/3 of the current national average 
13 It is useful so mention some summary statistics 
concerning teachers’ wages : 
Type of 
school 
Fraction Average 
teacher’s 
wage (in SM) 
Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Private 36.72% 6.03 3.68 0.5 15 
Public 63.28% 4.50 2.68 0.5 15 
All 100.00% 5.06 3.17 0.5 15 
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per-pupil spending – still it would be necessary to 
multiply by 8.6 the current level of spending on the 
lowest achieving pupils. Such result is driven by the 
extremely low elasticity of scores to per-pupil 
spending, but also by the great across-type 
dispersion of inputs and scores in Brazil. Such large 
reallocations would probably remain politically 
unfeasible. 
Betts & Roemer (2004) finished their paper 
suggesting that “money alone will not suffice to 
equalize educational opportunity”, and urging for 
“finding complementary means of improving 
outcomes for the disadvantaged”. We tried to 
contribute in this sense, and we showed that the 
simultaneous redistribution of monetary and non-
monetary inputs (like peer and school quality) would 
considerably reduce – by almost 50% – the 
magnitude of the financial redistribution needed. We 
believe this is an important result of our paper, which 
should be taken into account by EOp proponents 
and by policymakers. 
Of course, this set of policies (i.e., simultaneous 
redistribution of monetary and non-monetary inputs) 
would not be easily implemented in Brazil, nor 
anywhere else, since practical and political problems 
related to the financial redistribution, although 
downgraded, would still exist. Moreover, 
policymakers would still have to find appropriate 
ways for redistributing peer group quality and school 
effectiveness. Reducing segregation (that is, 
redistributing peer group quality) and increasing the 
probability of disadvantaged pupils to attend private 
schools (best-run schools in Brazil) are goals which 
can be linked to each other. Ideally, some sort of 
SES-sensitive formula funding would have to be 
coupled with an equity-sensitive voucher scheme, in 
such a way that good public schools (through 
formula funding), and especially good private 
schools (through voucher scheme), face strong 
incentives to enroll disadvantaged kids and to mix 
them with advantaged kids14. If these non-monetary 
redistributions were actually implemented, it is likely 
that a monetary redistribution would come as a by-
product, which makes this set of non-monetary 
policies even more attractive. 
Brazilian schooling system has its own particularities, 
but it is similar in many respects, to those of other 
developing countries (highly unequal distribution of 
inputs and outcomes; coexistence of private and 
public schools etc.). To a lesser extent, even 
schooling systems of developed countries share 
characteristics of the Brazilian one (nowhere can we 
find a system where all pupils are allocated the same 
amount of resources, socio-economic background 
typically has a strong influence on schooling 
outcomes etc.). So, we believe our results are not 
limited to observers who are interested in the 
Brazilian context, or in developing countries. In any 
case, in our future research, we plan to extend our 
application of EOp theory to education policy of other 
countries. 
14 Formula-funding and voucher systems experiences from 
countries such as Belgium (Vandenberghe, 1996) or Chile 
(Gradstein et al, 2004) could inspire Brazilian educational 
authorities. 
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Roemer’s EOp algorithm requires that, for each quantile, we find an allocation X(t,л) = X1, … XT , such that: 
 
ArgmaxX [MinT (at,л + bt,лXt)]                                                                                                                             [1] 
 
st ∑ pt Xt = R 
 
where variables are defined as in section 3. 
 
Assuming types t=1, 2, and assuming that type 1 will be the worst-off at the solution, [1] can be restated as: 
 
MaxX (a1,л + b1,лX1 )                                                                                                                                            [2] 
st  
 a2,л + b2,лX2 ≥ a1,л + b1,лX1                                                                                                                                  [3] 
 p1 X1 + p2 X2 = R                                                                                                                                                [4] 
 
By rewriting and combining [3] and [4], we obtain: 
 
X1 ≤ (R b2,л + p2(a2,л – a1,л))/(p1 b2,л + p2 b1,л)                                                                                                      [5] 
X2 = (R- p1 X1)/ p2                                                                                                                                                [6] 
 
Expression [5] sets an upper bound for the amount of resources to be allocated to individuals of type 1 at 
quantile л. As we are interested in maximizing the expected score of the worst-off individuals (type 1) at 
quantile л, we would like to set X1 as large as possible, that is, such that [5] holds with equality. Assuming 
objective function [2] is rising with X1 (i.e., elasticity of score to spending is significantly positive) we have that 
[5] at equality and [6] define a solution candidate. 
Generally, we would have to solve the program assuming each type to be the worst-off at the solution, but in 
the two-type case, this is not necessary. It is in fact redundant, because by combining the expression that 
defines the upper bound for the resources allocated to individual 2 and the budget constraint, we obtain an 
optimal allocation which is equivalent to the one provided by [5] and [6]. The intuition can be understood in the 
graphical representation of the “education technologies” below. 
Appendix 
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Figure 1. EOp solution with 2 types, at a given quantile. 
Panel A: “Interior solution”. 
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Panel B: “Corner solution”. 
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In Panel A of Figure 1, the EOp solution is given by the point where the two lines cross, that is, where S1 = S2, 
which is exactly the outcome-egalitarian solution. In Panel B, the EOp solution differs from the outcome-
egalitarian solution. The latter would require, either the allocation of negative amounts of the educational 
resource to type-1 individuals (such that their scores are driven down to reach those of type-2 individuals), or 
the violation of the budget constraint (such that a larger amount of input is allocated to type-2 individuals to 
improve their scores).  
 
If we work with three types, we have to assume each type is the worst-off, and solve the program defined by 
[2], [3], [4] and an additional constraint that guarantees that a given type is really the worst-off at the solution. 
For example, if type 1 is assumed to be the worst-off, inequality [7] would also have to be respected:  
 
a3,л + b3,лX3 ≥ a1,л + b1,лX1                                                                                                                             [7] 
 
If, for a given quantile and for all pair of types, there were “interior” solutions (such as the one shown in Panel A 
of Figure 1, or in Figure 2), then the egalitarian solution would obtain, and there would be no need to solve 
program [2]-[4] and [7] assuming each type to be the worst-off. 
Figure 2. EOp solution with 3 types, at a given quantile. 
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Beyond equity considerations, a pragmatic advantage of Roemer’s algorithm would be that it doesn’t harm 
efficiency very much, since it consists of a maximin objective function, instead of an egalitarian one. But that 
difference is meaningful only when the technology is such that an equal outcome is not feasible, even under a 
very generous redistribution (cf. Panel B in Figure 1). When technologies are linear, the elasticities are positive 
(estimated b > 0), and the differences between the parameters (as and bs) across types are not spectacular, 
the optimal distribution of the educational resources will be such that the expected scores are equal across 
types (i.e., outcome-egalitarian solutions will obtain).  
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